PostgreSQL Row Level Security Tutorial: Policies and Effective Roles

Row level security evaluates policies that restrict records available to particular operations and roles. It complements object privileges rather than replacing them. A useful exercise tests both allowed and denied paths with the same role context the application will use, because an owner or privileged account can produce misleadingly broad results during testing.

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Why Use PostgreSQL Row Level Security Tutorial: Policies and Effective Roles

Frequently Asked Questions

Does enabling row security grant SELECT permission automatically?

Object privileges and row policies address different layers. The role still needs appropriate table access, after which applicable policies govern which records or proposed values the operation may use.

Why can an owner see rows that a normal role cannot?

Ownership and special role attributes can bypass ordinary policy behavior under defined rules. Test using the intended application identity rather than assuming an administrative session demonstrates effective restrictions for every caller.

How do USING and WITH CHECK differ?

USING controls which existing rows an operation can target or observe, while WITH CHECK constrains proposed row values for supported writes. Keeping those responsibilities distinct helps prevent policies that restrict reads but allow unintended new ownership values.

Can a policy trust any client-supplied user identifier?

The identity source must be established through a trusted application and database boundary. A caller-controlled value cannot safely become authorization evidence merely because a policy expression references it.

What should a row-security test include?

Exercise visible, hidden, allowed-write and rejected-write cases using relevant roles. Successful access for one legitimate user does not establish that another user is prevented from reading or modifying the same records.